In this paper, a variety-expanding growth model has been constructed in the classical North-South framework. Optimal degree of IPR protection has been explicitly computed both for the North and the South in the sense of welfare maximizing, in the short run and non-short run of the economies. Endogenous innovation growth rate and the policy of innovation subsidy for the Southern government have been introduced into our model. The relationship between IPR protection and long-term growth rate has also been thoroughly investigated. Finally, the issue about international policy cooperation has been explored and we show that it is possible that an optimal degree of Southern IPR protection would also be globally efficient in some comparatively weak conditions. JEL classification: F42; H24; O31; O34; O38.
INTRODUCTION
Our major goal of this paper is to investigate the existence of an optimal degree of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection for the developing country in the classical North-South framework. In our general equilibrium model, the South invents new intermediates as well as the North, and the imitation, which only exists in the South, will be divided into two types 2 : the efficient imitation, that is imitating the intermediates invented in the North to improve the final output of the South, and the inefficient imitation, i.e., imitating other domestic innovators. It is easy to notice that a will hurt the South; while, alternatively, other papers argued that there is an optimal level of IPR protection for the South. To the former, for example, Chin and Grossman (1990) conducted their partial equilibrium analysis in a North-South trading environment with exclusion of any possibility of innovation in the South, finding that the North always benefits from having the protection of intellectual property rights while the South benefits from the ability to pirate technology. Deardorff (1992) studied the welfare effects of global patent protection and suggested that the welfare of the inventing country certainly rises with the extension of patent protection while that of the other country probably falls. Schneider (2005) 's analysis suggests that IPRs have a stronger impact on domestic innovation for developed counties and might even negatively impact innovation in developing countries. And also, in his seminal paper, Helpman (1993) develops a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North invents new products and the South imitates them, proving that the South will lose from tighter intellectual property rights in the short run of the economies.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, most of the subsequent literatures inspired by Helpman (1993) prove that there should exist an optimal degree of IPR protection in both quality-ladder models and expanding-variety models.
For instance, after noting that R&D is easier in competitive sectors than it is in monopolistic sectors for both technical and legal reasons, Horri and Iwaisako (2007) argued that there is an optimal degree of IPR protection so that the long-term growth rate is maximized. In an expanding-variety type R&D-based endogenous growth model, Kwan and Lai (2003) show that there is a tradeoff between current loss in consumption and future gain in growth rate when IPR protection is strengthened across industries, thereby proving that there exists a finite optimal degree of IPR protection.
What's more, Furukawa (2007) constructs a variety expansion model of endogenous growth in a closed economy, and shows that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation and IPR protection, thereby implying that IPR protection is not always the stronger the better. Chen and Puttitanun (2005) illustrate the trade-off between imitating foreign technologies and encouraging domestic innovation in a developing country's choice of IPRs and their empirical analysis confirms that there is a U-shaped relationship between IPRs and economic development. And inspired by the Chinese experience, Chu et al. (2011) develop a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier and show that optimal IPR protection is stage-dependent, that is, at an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation, while at a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation 5 .
In the present paper, it is shown that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between Northern welfare and the inverse measure of Southern IPR protection, which resembles to Helpman (1993) 's conclusion that tighter IPR protection also hurts the North whenever economies begin in steady state with certain small rates of imitation.
Moreover, after incorporating endogenous innovation growth rate into our model, we prove that there is a U-shaped relationship between Northern equilibrium growth rate and Southern IPR protection. On the other hand, for the South, we show that, given the specification of lump-sum taxation, an increasing of the subsidy rate to innovation will definitely improve the welfare. We argue that there always exists an optimal degree of Southern IPR protection in our model and there are complementary relationships between those optimal IPR protection policies and the innovation subsidy policy. Finally, it is confirmed that there is a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium growth rate and the IPR protection, and the equilibrium growth rate of the economy does not depend on innovation subsidy, after innovation growth rate being endogenously concerned.
Furthermore, there are also some papers that study the issue of international policy cooperation, for example, Grossman and Lai (2004) studied the policy game between the North and South, proving that the harmonization of patent policies is neither necessary nor sufficient for the efficiency of the global patent regime when two governments have an incentive to negotiate an international patent agreement.
However, our concerning of international policy cooperation, via noting that only Southern IPR protection is discussed, is a little different from that of Grossman and Lai (2004) , and actually, we argue the existence of an optimal degree of Southern IPR protection, which is explicitly computed, and which is globally efficient.
What's the main inspiration of the present paper? Firstly, a simple framework is supplied so that the optimal degree of IPR protection can be explicitly computed, which will completely supports very rich comparative static analyses. Secondly, some papers (Spencer and Brander, 1983; Glass, 1997; Muniagurria and Singh, 1997; Haaland and Kind, 2008) have studied the efficient employment of subsidy policy, nevertheless, few, if any, like the present paper thoroughly depicts the internal relationship between optimal IPR protection and the policy choice of innovation subsidy. We, accordingly, claim that a good understanding of the internal interaction mechanisms between different policies would greatly improve the efficiency of corresponding policy combinations in reality. It is especially worth emphasizing is that the case of endogenous innovation growth would lead to totally different conclusions relative to that of exogenous innovation growth. And hence we insist, as is shown in our model, that the above two cases should be comparatively and thoroughly studied, thereby offering insights into our recognition about institutional arrangements in reality. Moreover, the role of technology match has been discussed in determining the optimal IPR protection for the South in the North-South framework.
And finally, the present paper is encouraged to supply a simple approach leading to a new 6 understanding of international policy cooperation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model and our key propositions, section 3 discusses the issue of international policy cooperation conditional on the model in section 2, section 4 concludes and the Appendix provides 6 It is new because it is based upon the specification that there is only one control variable, which belongs to the South and intrinsically affects the North, and which is also endogenously impacted or partly determined by parameters belong to the North. And thus the way of discussing international policy cooperation is different from that of existing literatures, e.g., Kehoe (1989) , Maggi (1999) , Devereux and Engel (2003) , and Canzoneri et al (2005) . And especially, Kehoe (1989) referred to the international cooperative regime in the sense of that policies are set sequentially by a single decision-making body to maximize world welfare. Certainly, in the current paper we don't discuss such kind of cooperative game which intimately depends on the existence of a so-called world welfare function. Moreover, our discussion expands following two steps: firstly, the existence of optimal IPR protection both for the South and the North; and secondly, the possibilities of international policy cooperation.
the main mathematical derivations.
THE MODEL
In the classical North-South framework, the model is naturally divided into two parts, the North and the South, which are, nevertheless, linked by such activities that the South will imitate Northern innovation while with the Southern government faced with the problem to choose certain degree of IPR protection with purpose, on the one hand, of promoting economic growth with welfare improved, and, on the other hand, encouraging domestic innovation and respecting Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Moreover, in each part of the model, endogenous innovation growth rate is concerned with its resulting consequences being thoroughly discussed.
The North

Final Production
The final good sector employs labor and a set of intermediate goods as inputs. The technology for producing final good is represented by the following constant returns to scale production function, 
Imitation Process
As in the model of Helpman (1993) , in order to investigate the consequences of a tightening of IPR protection in the South, the costless imitation process reads as follows,
in which 0 S μ ≤ < ∞ denotes the imitation rate or the hazard rate at which each product that has not been imitated yet is going to be imitated at the next date and hence a tightening of IPR protection in the South implies a decline of 
Intermediate Sector
The intermediate good sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms, and technology is symmetric across varieties, that is, the production of one unit of intermediate good requires one unit of final good, which is assumed to be the numeraire. However, after the costless imitation process being introduced into the model, and hence once a product is imitated, the monopoly power of the original producer is lost and its price is pushed down to the marginal cost by competition.
Accordingly, the prices of intermediate goods amount to,
And it is easy to see that the aggregate demand for intermediates can be expressed as follows,
Innovation Sector
We introduce, following Helpman (1993) , the following innovation process, 
which evolves in accordance with the following differential equation,
And the solution of the ordinary differential equation (ODE) amounts to, 
) of being imitated, and thus the standard no arbitrage condition of the asset markets can be expressed as follows, 
(
where , m N r denotes the instantaneous rate of return for innovation.
Market Clearing for Final Good
As usual, the final good is used for consumption, for production of intermediate products, and also for innovation. Consequently, the market clearing condition for the final good can be written as, (4) into (1) produces,
Substituting (5), (6) and (11) into (10), then the following expression of aggregate consumption is immediately derived,
Hence, we obtain,
Where
Noting that (0) 0
Representative Agent
Without loss of generality, we assume that the abstract general equilibrium economy is populated by infinitely lived agent who derives utility from consumption and supplies inelastic labor. Agent is supposed to exhibit log preferences 7 with perfect foresight and the corresponding dynamic maximization problem is given by, 
in which , m N r is defined in (9') and N C γ also denotes the equilibrium growth rate of the model economy. And as expected, the growth rate in (16) is a decreasing function of imitation rate thanks to the limited duration of the monopoly, thereby effectively reducing the private value of each innovation. Therefore, we conclude, only from the viewpoint of long-run economic growth, that a tightening of IPR protection in the South will benefit the North.
The Welfare Effects of Southern IPR Protection to the North
Notice from the previous section that,
where ( On the other hand, we restrict the analysis to economies that are initially in steady
, then in view of (13) and (14) shows that,
And so, by (17), the following first order condition immediately,
Thus, we obtain,
Moreover, noting by (14) that, Finally, a comparison of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 shows that, under certain conditions, the short-run welfare effect of IPR protection in the South would be totally different from the other non-short-run, say, midterm-run or long-run, welfare effects.
In particular, a tightening of IPR protection may factually improve the long-run welfare of the North while reducing its short-run welfare.
Endogenous Innovation Growth Rate
First of all, we still employ the following innovation process,
Then, assume that developing ( ) including accumulation of experience following from learning by doing (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Young, 1993; Stein, 1997) and "standing on the shoulder of giants" (see, Scotchmer, 1991) and so on. All in all, the specification reveals the idea or the fact that technological process or technical innovation will play a critical role in maintaining barriers to entry and therefore impacting market structure (see, Levin, 1978) . And market structure in turn will greatly shape the technological processes.
Thus, the expected profit maximization problem facing the innovator is defined as follows,
where (1 ) S dt μ − denotes the probability of not being imitated in the next dt length of time interval. Solving the static maximization problem yields,
from which we see that 0 (9) with (9'), the following nominal interest rate is derived,
where , m N r denotes the instantaneous rate of return for innovation. Notice from (16) that the standard Euler equation of the representative consumer is expressed as,
To make the notations more compact, we put,
And,
And thus we can easily get,
Therefore, we conclude the following proposition,
PROPOSITION 3. Given the endogenous innovation growth rate defined in (19),
there is a critical value of the inverse measure of IPR protection,
That is, there is a U-shaped relationship between the Northern equilibrium growth rate and the Southern IPR protection.
REMARK. It follows from (16) that a strengthening of Southern IPR protection will always promote the long-run economic growth of the North. However, after innovation growth rate being endogenously concerned, there is a U-shaped relationship between the Northern equilibrium growth rate and the Southern IPR protection, i.e., a tightening of Southern IPR protection may inevitably retard the Northern economic growth, due to Proposition 3.
Moreover, noting that if (0)
Hence, by (13), (14), (15) and (19), and noting that ( ) ( )
On the other hand, if (0)
So from (17) we see that,
holds true for both (0)
Therefore, combining with Proposition 3, we get, REMARK. Interesting should it be to notice that Helpman (1993) shows that tighter intellectual property rights also hurt the North whenever economies begin in steady state with small rates of imitation, however, it is shown, after the innovation growth rate being endogenously concerned, that a tightening of Southern IPR protection will definitely hurt the North when the imitation rate is above one critical value whenever the economies begin in steady state or begin in non-steady state.
Moreover, it would be remarkable that, after incorporating endogenous innovation growth rate into the current model, a comparison of Proposition 4 with Proposition 1
and Proposition 2 shows that the Northern welfare effects with respect to Southern choice of IPR protection would be totally different. And we may further claim that endogenous innovation growth rate in the North would result in a much subtler relationship between Southern IPR protection and Northern welfare.
The South
Final Good Production
Different from the North, here we specify the following production function for the competitive firms, , 1 A t , respectively. Moreover, the exponent onΘ is just for computation convenience.
Imitation Process
Besides the costless imitation process introduced in (2), we define the following another costless imitation process,
where 0 S μ ≤ < ∞ represents the hazard rate and also is an inverse measure of IPR protection.
2 , ( ) 
and, 
c S S
2.12. Innovation Sector 9 In particular, they share the same marginal cost, i.e., one unit of final good. And thus, there are not any arbitrage opportunities in the Southern imitation sector. Moreover, even though they don't share the same marginal cost initially, long-run competition (perfect competition assumption) definitely pulls back the economy to stay in an equilibrium without any arbitrage opportunities, therefore, we, initially, without loss of generality, suppose that the economy is just lying in the above long-run equilibrium.
As for the North, we employ the following innovation process 10 ,
where ( 
And its solution is given as, π is the monopolistic profits in the differentiated intermediates market. Then, using the free entry condition in the R&D markets, the nominal interest rate reads as,
( it is an increasing function of the subsidy rate to innovation.
Market Clearing for the Final Good
Notice that the final good is used for consumption, for production of intermediate machines, and for innovation, the market clearing condition can therefore be written as,
in which S C represents the aggregate consumption and ( ) S X t is given in (27).
Substituting (24) and (25) into (22) produces,
And so substituting (27), (28) and (35) into (34) yields,
Then, we obtain,
Hence, we get,
2.14. Representative Agent
As usual, the dynamic maximization problem for the representative agent is given 
S S S S S S S B t r B t w t L C t T
from which we find that, just from the point of view of long-run economic growth, both a tightening of IPR protection and an increasing of the rate of innovation subsidy, provided the lump-sun taxation and ceteris paribus, will benefit the South 12 .
REMARK. Noting that our theme is not optimal taxation theory, we only introduce lump-sum tax into our model as the unique resource of governmental subsidy to innovation. However, it is predictable that the discussion of optimal innovation subsidy will immediately become very complicated after incorporating both government balanced budget constraint and some other linear taxes, say, income tax and consumption tax, into the present model.
12 Gould and Gruben (1996) , indeed, find that stronger intellectual property rights protection corresponds to higher economic growth rates in a cross-country sample.
Government
In this section, specifically, both N g and S g are assumed to be exogenously given.
It follows from (37) and (43) that, the welfare (or utility) function of the South can be expressed as,
Hence, if (0)
, then by (7), (37), (39) and (44), we have the following first order condition (FOC),
where 5 
whose optimality is fully ensured by the following second order condition,
, then by (30), (37), (38) and (44), we get the following FOC,
where 6 2 3 4 (0) 
S S S S S S S S S S
And meanwhile noting from (38) that,
, then by (7), (30), (37), (38), (39) and (44), we get the following FOC, Hence, we obtain,
Further notice that, by (38), (39), and N S g g = , then the following second order condition is clearly fulfilled,
Accordingly, we conclude that,
then a tightening of intellectual
property rights protection will improve the welfare of the South. 
REMARK. Proposition 5(i) shows that a strengthening of IPR protection will
definitely improve the welfare of the South, given exogenous innovation growth, in the non-short run of the economies. It is, one the one hand, different from the point insisted by Chin and Grossman (1990) , Deardorff (1992) and Schneider (2005) that a tightening of IPR protection will surely hurt the South, and on the other hand, different from the illustration of the existence of an optimal degree of IPR protection shown in Kwan and Lai (2003) , Furukawa (2007) and Horri and Iwaisako (2007) .
Thus, we argue, regardless of the specificity of model specification, that we have provided the conditions under which a tightening of IPR protection will definitely improve the Southern welfare in general expanding-variety models and in the classical North-South framework. Helpman (1993) , provided that the South just imitates the new products invented by the North, proved that the South will lose from tighter intellectual property rights in the short run of the economies, however, after introducing Southern innovation activities into the framework resembles to Helpman (1993) , Proposition 5(iv) shows conditions based upon which there is an optimal degree of IPR protection, i.e., the South may gain from tighter intellectual property rights, in the short run of the economies.
On the other hand, notice that, by (33), (37), (41) and (44) 
represents the probability of not being imitated by other domestic firms in the next dt length of time interval. Solving the static maximization problem gives, The point worth emphasizing here is that government subsidization of R&D should invoke "additionality effect" while it is also possible that it will "crowd out" private financing of R&D (e.g., Görg and Strobl, 2007) . Therefore, the innovation growth rate may and may not be an increasing function of governmental subsidy rate. To make things easier, here in the present paper we don't take the so-called "crowding-out effect" into account.
where , m S r denotes the instantaneous rate of return for innovation. And note from (43) that the standard Euler equation for the representative agent reads as,
To make the notations more compact, we put, (1 ) 1 (1 ) 9 (1 )( ) ( 1) ( )
So we find that 9 1 0
( 1)
And since,
Accordingly, we summarize the following proposition, PROPOSITION 10. Conditional on the endogenous innovation growth rate defined in (48), then there is a critical value of the inverse measure of IPR protection,
That is, there is a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium growth rate and the IPR protection.
REMARK. It is worth noting that there should be a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium growth rate and the IPR protection after innovation growth rate being endogenously concerned while it follows from (43) that a tightening of IPR protection always implies an increasing of equilibrium growth rate. Proposition 10, indeed, is consistent with Chen and Puttitanun (2005)'s conclusion following from their empirical analysis with a panel data for 64 developing countries.
On the other hand, since,
Thus, by (48),
So we have, PROPOSITION 11. Based on the endogenous innovation growth rate given by (48),
, the equilibrium growth rate of the economy is independent of the subsidy rate to innovation.
REMARK. Interesting should it be that, conditional on the endogenous innovation growth rate shown in (48), we see by Proposition 11 that the equilibrium growth rate is independent of the subsidy rate to innovation, which is in accord with the conclusion from Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998) . Nonetheless, it is obviously shown by (43) that an increasing of the rate of innovation subsidy, provided the lump-sum taxation and ceteris paribus, will always imply a resulting increasing of equilibrium growth rate, which resembles to the results from Howitt (1999 Howitt ( , 2000 . To sum up, it is endogenous innovation growth that leads us from Howitt (1999 Howitt ( , 2000 to Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998) 
And that's the whole story. Obviously, the key point is" ( ) ( )
i.e., an increasing of the growth rate of innovation implies an increasing of average cost of innovation, which partly, if not completely, depends on our definition of ( )
Noting that our definition of ( ) S b t is reasonable and acceptable in some sense. We argue that the current paper at least provides us with a "possibility", and given the logic behind the possibility, the above story inevitably happens.
INTERNATIONAL POLICY COOPERATION
In this section, we study the issue of policy cooperation between the North and the South. Note that an agreement of IPR protection cannot be achieved unless the incentive-problem has been solved firstly. Our purpose is to search for conditions under which a degree of IPR protection is optimal with respect to the welfare for both the North and the South. And as is shown that the welfare functions of the North and the South are maximized simultaneously, we call the corresponding degree of IPR protection in the South globally efficient.
As a matter of fact, we obtain, On the other hand, for the South, we prove that, given the specification of lump-sum taxation, an increasing of the subsidy rate to innovation will definitely improve the welfare. And we show, in different conditions, that there always exists a corresponding optimal degree of IPR protection, and also our model points out that there are complementary relationships between those optimal IPR protection policies and the innovation subsidy policy. Furthermore, conditional on the endogenous innovation growth rate, it is argued that there is a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium growth rate and the policy of IPR protection while the equilibrium growth rate is independent of the choice of subsidy policy.
Moreover, we show that under certain weak conditions, a degree of Southern IPR protection will be optimal with respect to the welfare for both the North and the South, thereby implying the existence of an optimal degree of Southern IPR protection which is globally efficient.
Finally, we summarize the economic implications of our exploration from the following two viewpoints: firstly, for those developing countries, like China, having been involved in international trade and global competition, the corresponding policy-makers naturally face the following problem: what are the best institutional arrangements for gaining access to the knowledge (or innovation) that already exists in developed countries and meanwhile encouraging domestic production and employment of new knowledge (or innovation)? Rather, the current paper has been encouraged to translate the above circumstances requiring trade-off into our model and further our discussion has partly, if not completely, solved the above problem.
Furthermore, admittedly, our ultimate goal is rapid and sustainable economic growth with widely shared and improved economic welfare. On the one hand, as is commonly known, endogenous growth theory distinguishes itself from neoclassical growth theory by incorporating knowledge (Romer, 1986 (Romer, , 1990 Grossman and Helpman, 1990) , human capital (Lucas, 1988 (Lucas, , 1993 Eicher, 1996) , endogenous technological change (Romer, 1986 (Romer, , 1990 Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Eicher, 1996) , endogenous innovation (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and R&D (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Segerstrom, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones, 1995; Stokey, 1995; Howitt, 1999 Howitt, , 2000 Segerstrom and Zolnierek, 1999) Here, we insist, in line with North (1971 North ( , 1994 and Acemoglu et al (2004) , that efficient institutional arrangements would form efficient incentive structure of a society, and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinants of economic performance. And as is shown by our paper, optimal IPR protection is just one crucial institutional variable of many optional institutional instruments in the background of global trade.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 7.
From (39), (41) and (45), we see that, By (38) and (46), we get, 
S S S S S S S S S S S
Noting that,
which always holds true. Therefore, by (41) 
Then by (39), (40) and (49), we get,
where,
Hence, by (39), (B.1) and (B.2), 3 3 6 3 8 6 6 1 (0) 0
C. Proof of Proposition 9.
Noting by (38), (39) and (47) that,
which always holds true. Thus,
by (41) Noting that if (0)
by the following fact, First, a comparison of (18) and (45) First, a comparison of (18) and (47) shows that if, Moreover, from (14), (38) and (39) 
